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For decision makers, climate change is a problem in risk assessment and risk management.  3 
It is, therefore, surprising that the needs and lessons of risk assessment have not featured 4 
more centrally in the consideration of priorities for physical climate science research, or in 5 
the Working Group I contributions to the major Assessment Reports of the 6 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  This article considers the reasons, which 7 
include a widespread view that the job of physical climate science is to provide predictions 8 
and projections - with a focus on likelihood rather than risk - and that risk assessment is a 9 
job for others.  This view, it is argued, is incorrect.  There is an urgent need for physical 10 
climate science to take the needs of risk assessment much more seriously. The challenge of 11 
meeting this need has important implications for priorities in climate research, climate 12 
modelling and climate assessments.   13 
 14 
  15 
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1. Introduction 16 
Climate science has achieved a great deal.  It has demonstrated unequivocally that human 17 
activities have been the major driver of climate change since the mid twentieth century 18 
(IPCC, 2013), and there has been considerable – if insufficient – progress toward global 19 
actions to address the problems arising.  But following the Paris Agreement, what are the 20 
priorities for climate research? Which concerns should guide the further development of 21 
global climate models? And what are the consequences for climate assessments, especially 22 
those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)?  23 
From the perspective of societal needs - that is, the needs of decision makers in 24 
governments, businesses or civil society - climate change is a problem in risk assessment1 25 
and risk management. Therefore a central question is: what information can science 26 
provide to meet these needs? In this article I want to focus particularly on the contribution 27 
of physical climate science, and the community of scientists represented by IPCC Working 28 
Group I (WGI). It is notable that the requirements to inform risk assessment have had little 29 
prominence in the WGI contributions to the major IPCC Assessment Reports, such as the 30 
most recent 5th report (IPCC, 2013).  By contrast, these requirements were highlighted 31 
prominently in the Summary for Policy Makers of the WGII contribution (IPCC, 2014). This 32 
article explores the reasons why physical climate science has not paid more attention to risk 33 
assessment and argues that this situation should be remedied urgently.  It also discusses 34 
some of the implications for priorities in climate research and modelling, and for IPCC 35 
climate assessments. 36 
                                                          
1 Assessment of opportunities is also important and can be considered within a similar framework, but is not a 
focus of this article. 
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2. Principles of risk assessment 37 
In simple terms a risk is “something bad that might happen” (King et al, 2015). Risk 38 
assessment requires information about: 1) what events are possible; 2) how likely they are; 39 
and 3) what the impacts or consequences could be.  A common measure of the risk 40 
associated with a specific event is risk = likelihood x impact, which highlights the importance 41 
of considering likelihood and impact together.  Risk assessment cannot be done properly by 42 
focussing on only one of these factors, or by considering them only sequentially: for risk, the 43 
interaction between them matters. 44 
 45 
A landmark climate change risk assessment was published in 2015 by King et al. The  46 
introduction to this report summarises key principles of risk assessment as follows: 47 
1. Identify risks in relation to objectives (e.g. “protect human prosperity and security”) 48 
2. Identify the biggest risks 49 
3. Consider the full range of probabilities 50 
4. Use the best available information 51 
5. Take a holistic view (i.e. consider all relevant factors) 52 
6. Be explicit about value judgements 53 
 54 
Risk assessment is invariably a multi-disciplinary task: the necessary information can only be 55 
obtained by drawing together the expertise from more than one community. For example, 56 
physical climate science can provide information about future climate, whilst biological, 57 
economic and social science are required to assess the full range of impacts and 58 
consequences. However, there is no single “best” measure of impact: as is highlighted by 59 
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principles 1 and 6, impact is ultimately a consequence of choices about objectives and 60 
values.  61 
 62 
A key consequence of principles 2 and 3 is the importance of paying specific attention to 63 
high impact events, even if their likelihood is considered low. Insuring homes against fire 64 
risk is a standard example: most people buy such insurance not because they consider it 65 
likely that their house will burn down, but rather because their potential loss is very great.  66 
 67 
Concerning principles 3 and 4, quantitative information - where it is available - is always 68 
desirable. However, another important insight from the literature on risk assessment is that 69 
qualitative information can still be very valuable.  In particular, there are many situations in 70 
which only qualitative assessments of likelihood are possible (e.g. Weaver et al, 2013; 71 
Weaver et al, 2017; Shepherd et al, 2018). In such situations it is common to use qualitative 72 
tools, such as discrete scenarios. A scenario describes a plausible sequence of future events 73 
but is not associated with a specific probability.  However, the impacts arising from different 74 
scenarios can be explored in detail. If scenarios are designed well, they are very useful to 75 
inform decision making.  76 
 77 
3. Why hasn’t physical climate science paid more attention to risk assessment? 78 
Why didn’t the IPCC produce a risk assessment like that of King et al (2015) at a much earlier 79 
date?  A key reason is the “siloing” of expertise between the three Working Groups, which 80 
has inhibited the necessary integration of knowledge from different disciplines (i.e. taking a 81 
“holistic view”).  This siloing has been exacerbated by a scoping process for the major 82 
assessment cycles that remains too “bottom-up”, starting with the scientists rather than 83 
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with the needs of decision makers.  One peculiarity of this process is that scoping of the 84 
headline Synthesis Report occurs only long after the scoping of the individual working group 85 
reports. To meet the needs of decision makers more effectively it should be the other way 86 
round. It is important to acknowledge that the recent cross-cutting reports (e.g. IPCC, 2012; 87 
IPCC, 2018) are evidence of significant progress in the IPCC addressing the needs for risk 88 
assessment more effectively, but the cycle of major assessment reports is continuing in the 89 
Sixth Assessment without substantial changes to the process. 90 
One consequence of the siloing of climate science is that WGI scientists have tended to 91 
assume that risk assessment is not their business because it requires information about 92 
impacts that is possessed by WGII. However, this is incorrect.  Impacts and risks can – 93 
indeed must – be assessed, and where possible quantified, using a wide range of metrics. 94 
WGI is the appropriate community to assess risks in terms of climate variables (e.g. 95 
temperatures, carbon budgets, extreme weather etc), especially variables that are relevant 96 
to a wide range of decisions in connection with adaptation or mitigation. 97 
An additional - related - reason that WGI has paid little attention to risk assessment is the 98 
widespread view that the primary job of the WGI community is to provide predictions and 99 
projections (i.e. predictions conditioned on socio-economic scenarios) rather than risk 100 
assessments.2  The WGI community has focussed large resources on attempts to “quantify 101 
the uncertainty in climate predictions/projections” (e.g. Hawkins and Sutton, 2009), i.e. on 102 
quantifying likelihoods, with little attention to impacts. This focus reflects the strong 103 
influence of meteorology on the development of climate science.  Predictions in 104 
                                                          
2 See, for example, the WCRP Strategic Framework 2005-15: Coordinated Observation and Prediction of the 
Earth System. 
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meteorology involve using models to propagate forward information about the current 105 
state of the atmosphere (i.e. initial conditions) to generate quantitative estimates of its 106 
state and uncertainty at a future time, often expressed in terms of quantified likelihoods.  107 
Confidence that these likelihoods are meaningful relies either on (1) repeating the 108 
prediction process sufficiently often that skill and reliability can be demonstrated robustly, 109 
or (2) arguments and evidence that the relevant uncertainties can all be quantified, at least 110 
in principle. Unfortunately, neither of these conditions holds for statements about future 111 
climate change, at least for lead times beyond a decade or so.  Anthropogenic climate 112 
change is a unique experiment and there is a significant body of research demonstrating 113 
that there are no adequate methods to quantify all the epistemic uncertainties associated 114 
with the climate response to anthropogenic greenhouse gas forcing (e.g. those related to 115 
processes missing from all climate models), even at a global scale; for regional and smaller 116 
scales the problem is much worse.  117 
The impossibility of quantifying precisely the likelihood that future climate change will have 118 
a particular magnitude (or other specific features) does not, of course, mean we have no 119 
information about it.  Scientific arguments and evidence can often provide bounds or – in 120 
IPCC terminology - a “likely range” for key parameters such as global mean temperature.  121 
And, of course, if we can acquire new evidence that enables narrowing such bounds, this is 122 
progress. However, we should not imagine that it will ever be possible to provide detailed 123 
and meaningful probability distributions (pdfs) for future climate change analogous to those 124 
that - at least in principle - are possible for short range weather forecasts. 125 
A final reason that may have contributed to the WGI community neglecting the needs of risk 126 
assessment is concern about accusations of scaremongering (e.g. Sutton, 2018). Risk 127 
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assessment does involve drawing attention to potential “bad” outcomes even when they 128 
are very uncertain. Such an approach does not come naturally to many scientists who - for 129 
good reasons - are cautious by nature. The politicised debates around climate change have 130 
exacerbated this situation. 131 
4. Some consequences 132 
The consequence of physical climate science paying little attention to the needs of risk 133 
assessment has been that important issues have been neglected. Two examples can 134 
illustrate this point.  135 
One consequence has been to afford insufficient attention to the low-likelihood high impact 136 
events which - as already discussed - are a central concern in risk assessment. King et al 137 
(2015) point out that decision makers facing risks are typically most concerned with two 138 
questions: 1) what is likely? 2) how bad could it be/what must we avoid? The latter question 139 
is fundamental to the development of robust strategies for both adaption (e.g. “resilience”) 140 
and mitigation. However, WGI has focussed overwhelmingly on question 1 (e.g. assessing 141 
the likely range for key parameters). But physical climate science has much knowledge and 142 
expertise to bring to question 2. It is essential that climate science identifies what is possible 143 
in the climate system, not merely what is likely (e.g. Weaver et al, 2013; Schellnhuber, 144 
2018). Possibilities - which come with the potential for surprises - are a major concern for 145 
risk assessment. Furthermore, there are no fundamental obstacles to including assessments 146 
of the relevant risks within WGI reports (Sutton, 2018). 147 
WGI has given some attention to the potential for “abrupt” climate change. However, 148 
abrupt changes are only a subset of low-likelihood high impact scenarios and not necessarily 149 
the most important subset (Sutton, 2018). High climate sensitivity is an example of a very 150 
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high impact possibility that is not associated with any abrupt change in the Earth system. 151 
Furthermore, even when WG1 has considered low-likelihood high impact scenarios it has 152 
tended to focus too narrowly on likelihood and given insufficient attention to impacts.  Here 153 
is an example from the AR5 SPM (IPCC, 2013): “It is very unlikely that the AMOC will 154 
undergo an abrupt transition or collapse in the 21st century for the scenarios considered.”  155 
No information whatsoever about the impacts of an AMOC collapse is communicated, 156 
despite the importance of impact information for decision-making. WGII is not the 157 
appropriate community to provide information about the magnitude of regional climate 158 
change or sea level rise that could result from a collapse of the AMOC, were it to occur; this 159 
responsibility sits squarely with the WGI, but WGI - either as a research community or in the 160 
production of IPCC reports - has not considered it a priority. This neglect must be remedied.  161 
A second example is that physical climate science has until recently afforded surprisingly 162 
little attention to what is a key issue for many decision makers, namely quantifying current 163 
risks – more specifically, what is the current likelihood of high impact events? Such events 164 
are by definition rare, i.e. they are associated with low likelihood.  But whether this 165 
likelihood is 1 in 20, 1 in 200 or 1 in 200,000 is of great importance for those concerned with 166 
contingency planning and building resilience. In this case the quantification of likelihoods is 167 
very important, and is more tractable than for statements about future climate change. In a 168 
changing (non-stationary) climate, the appropriate likelihoods cannot be reliably estimated 169 
from historical data alone. A model of how climate change is affecting likelihoods (and risk) 170 
is required. For simple events (e.g. daily extremes of temperature) statistical models may 171 
suffice, but for more complex events (e.g. multivariate or correlated hazards) large 172 
ensembles of simulations with general circulation models are needed (Stott et al, 2015; 173 
Mizuta et al, 2017).  The recent-climate component of the Japanese d4PDF programme 174 
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(Mizuta et al, 2017) is a pioneering example of the type of work required, although it does 175 
not directly address the attribution of changing risk to specific drivers. There is an urgent 176 
need for much more research on this problem. 177 
5. The role of scenarios  178 
As discussed in section 2, risk assessment situations in which likelihoods cannot be 179 
quantified with precision are by no means unusual.  Strategic planning in government and 180 
business routinely makes use of scenarios as tools to inform thinking about future 181 
possibilities, and how to manage them.  Thus, scenarios are the obvious tool to describe 182 
future climate in ways that are relevant to decision makers.  The impacts and consequences 183 
of climate scenarios can be explored in considerable quantitative detail, using metrics that 184 
range from meteorological (e.g. rainfall rate) to those that are most decision-relevant (e.g. 185 
flood level, numbers of people affected, economic loss etc).  This characterisation of impacts 186 
must, of course, include the uncertainty in these impacts. 187 
Climate scenarios - in the sense used here - differ from climate projections.  Climate 188 
projections, as used by the WGI community, purport to be a conditional prediction in which 189 
the product is some form of continuous likelihood distribution for a particular socio-190 
economic scenario. Climate scenarios are a discrete set of physically-consistent and self-191 
consistent storylines about the future, under a specified set of assumptions. Indeed, 192 
Shepherd et al (2018) use the term “storylines” to describe climate scenarios of this type. 193 
They define a storyline as “a physically self-consistent unfolding of past events or of 194 
plausible future events”, and have recently developed the concept in detail, explaining how 195 
it can be used to synthesise scientific evidence in decision-relevant terms. 196 
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Many national climate scenarios have been developed (e.g. 197 
http://www.climatescenarios.nl/, http://scenarios.globalchange.gov) but interestingly 198 
discrete global or regional climate scenarios have not been widely used, arguably because 199 
the WGI climate science community has not promoted them.  By contrast, socio-economic 200 
scenarios have long been used by IPCC (e.g. O’Neill et al, 2014). However, for the purposes 201 
of risk assessment there is little difference between our knowledge/ignorance of (say) 202 
future population growth and our knowledge/ignorance of (say) the future rate of global 203 
warming, so it would be helpful for decision makers if the same tools – scenarios – were 204 
used to communicate this knowledge. Such an approach would be in line with King et al 205 
(2015)’s fifth principle of risk assessment: take a holistic approach.  Decision-relevant 206 
climate scenarios could usefully be developed to sample all the major dimensions of 207 
epistemic uncertainty (e.g. rapid economic growth, high greenhouse gas emissions and high 208 
climate sensitivity).    209 
As has already been emphasised, high impact scenarios are of special importance for risk 210 
assessment. Sutton (2018) proposed the development of “Physically Plausible High Impact 211 
Scenarios” (PPHIS) as a specific tool for the WGI community to assess and communicate the 212 
relevant scientific evidence. 213 
6. Conclusions and further implications 214 
For decision makers, climate change is a problem in risk assessment and risk management.  215 
It is, therefore, surprising that the needs and lessons of risk assessment have not featured 216 
more prominently in the consideration of priorities for physical climate science3, or in the 217 
                                                          
3 Even the latest WCRP Strategic Plan 2019-2028 (https://www.wcrp-climate.org/wcrp-sp) hardly mentions risk 
and includes no specific consideration of risk assessment needs. 
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WGI contributions to the major IPCC Assessment Reports. In this article I have argued that 218 
this state of affairs is a result of the siloing of climate science between different disciplines 219 
(for example, between the three IPCC working groups), but it has been exacerbated by a 220 
widespread view that the job of the WGI community is to provide predictions and 221 
projections (with a focus on likelihood rather than risk) and that risk assessment is a job for 222 
others.  This view, I have argued, is incorrect.   Risk assessment requires the consideration of 223 
impacts as well as likelihood.  Furthermore, impacts must be assessed and quantified using a 224 
wide range of variables, and the WGI community is the appropriate group to assess impacts 225 
and risks in terms of decision-relevant physical climate variables. Future WGI reports should 226 
address this requirement.  227 
There is also a need to recognise explicitly that, whilst some quantitative bounds can be 228 
assessed and potentially narrowed, it will never be possible to quantify with precision the 229 
likelihood that future climate change will take a particular form (e.g. magnitude). 230 
Consequently, an important task for the WGI community is to develop discrete sets of 231 
climate scenarios, which individually are not associated with a specific probability but 232 
which collectively are designed to span the relevant uncertainty in the climate response to 233 
anthropogenic forcing (not merely the “likely range” for specific socio-economic scenarios). 234 
The “storyline” method of Shepherd et al (2018) offers a powerful approach. This work 235 
should include systematic attention to identifying and developing potential high impact 236 
scenarios, even if their likelihood is considered low (Sutton, 2018).  Impacts, including the 237 
uncertainty in impacts, should be assessed for each climate scenario. 238 
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King et al (2015) emphasise that risks must always be assessed in relation to objectives. In 239 
the case of climate change, the relevant objectives relate to: (i) mitigation, and (ii) 240 
adaptation.  For mitigation, specific priorities for WGI include: 241 
1. Develop a discrete set of global climate scenarios. These should include scenarios 242 
for, e.g., high climate sensitivity or high TCRE due to changes in the natural carbon 243 
sink. The design of such scenarios should be based on understanding of the relevant 244 
Earth System processes. 245 
2. For each global climate scenario quantify the conditional impacts: 246 
a. On the remaining carbon budget to reach specific warming targets (e.g. IPCC, 247 
2018).  248 
b. On a range of decision-relevant physical climate variables (e.g. global sea 249 
level rise; major changes in regional climates such as the monsoons; the 250 
likelihood of triggering irreversible melting of Sheets; etc.) 251 
For adaptation, specific priorities include: 252 
1. Quantify current risks, in particular the current likelihood of a wide range of 253 
decision-relevant high impact physical events (notably extreme weather), including 254 
multi-hazard and correlated risks.  In this area there is an urgent need for research to 255 
address the attribution of changing risks to specific drivers. 256 
2. To assess future risks:  257 
a. Develop regional climate scenarios (a discrete set for each chosen region). 258 
On regional scales, changes in atmospheric circulation are potentially as 259 
important as changes in global mean temperature, so regional scenarios must 260 
be designed accordingly.  These should include specific high impact scenarios, 261 
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e.g. associated with a shutdown in the AMOC or an abrupt shift in monsoon 262 
circulations.  263 
b. For each regional climate scenario, quantify the conditional impacts and risks. 264 
As for current risk, this assessment should include a wide range of decision-265 
relevant high impact physical events, including multi-hazard and correlated 266 
risks.  267 
These priorities also have consequences for climate modelling. For example, the importance 268 
of modelling strategies to quantify current risks was already highlighted in section 4. This is 269 
one area where new MIPs should be considered (e.g. a “RISK-MIP”, possibly based on the 270 
d4PDF experimental design).  In this case large ensembles which sample internal variability 271 
(e.g. Kay et al, 2015), at the highest resolutions possible (to capture high impact weather), 272 
are a key requirement. A second area is the development of appropriate global and regional 273 
climate scenarios. Here, large ensembles are also required – in this case particularly to 274 
define adequately the climate response to anthropogenic forcing – but high resolution may 275 
be a lower priority. The 10-member ScenarioMIP experiments are a step in the right 276 
direction but it should be recognised that they rely on an unprovable assumption that the 277 
current generation of models adequately spans the real uncertainty in the climate response 278 
to anthropogenic forcing, and furthermore these experiments involve no focused attempt 279 
to consider properly the full range of low likelihood high impact scenarios.   The need to 280 
assess the impacts of specific climate scenarios, including low-likelihood scenarios, is a third 281 
area. An “AMOC-MIP”, for example, could be used to assess the potential impacts of a 282 
significant shutdown in the AMOC.   283 
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The physical climate science, WGI, community cannot of course complete the task of climate 284 
change risk assessment by itself. Collaboration with other communities - notably WGs II and 285 
III - and directly with decision-makers, is essential. In the context of the IPCC Assessment 286 
Cycle, global and regional climate scenarios developed by WGI could be taken up by WGs II 287 
and III, and be used by national governments, to assess the full range of impacts and risks, 288 
and the implications for risk management. They would also be very helpful for the 289 
production of an integrated Synthesis Report. More cross-cutting IPCC reports, and changes 290 
to the scoping process for the major assessment reports could also make very valuable 291 
contributions. Essential to all this, however, is for physical climate science to take its critical 292 
role in risk assessment much more seriously than hitherto. 293 
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